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Abstract
Using a simple two-period model, this paper examines the effects of the acqui-
sition of mines/resources by a final goods producer located in a resource-importing
country on resource prices in both the first (the present) and second (the future)
periods, profits of firms, and welfare. We find that an increase in the mines owned
by a final goods producer can increase the resource price in the first period and/or,
interestingly, the second period. The strategic behavior of a resource-extracting firm
located in a resource-exporting country produces this result. Whether the resource
price increases in either period depends on the demand structure for the final goods
and the resource supply condition of the final goods producer which owns the mines
in the second period. We also consider three extended situations: joint exploration,
entry of speculators, and the case of a non-committed investment.
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1 Introduction
Expecting that many types of resources will become scarcer in the near future, interme-
diate and final goods producers have been competing seriously for stable procurement of
resources. The variety of resources that serve as inputs into the production of products
has also increased, and products developed over the past few decades increasingly use very
scarce resources, such as rare earth metals. For example, nickel, chrome, titanium, and
palladium are used to produce cell phones. And, gallium is used to produce light emitting
diodes. In some industries, these minor metals are critical for production. Accordingly,
the producers of such products, particularly those in resource-importing countries, have
increased efforts to acquire these resources.
These mining resources are often unevenly distributed across a small number of coun-
tries. Furthermore, resource mines may be owned by a small number of resource-extraction
firms called “resource majors.” Thus, the concentration ratios of several types of resource
markets are very high.1 In contrast, the number of intermediate/final goods producers
is relatively large. Thus, resource-extracting firms have bargaining power when resource
prices are being determined.
Given this situation, some final goods producers have begun to acquire and develop
their own mines (or oil fields).2 The governments of resource-importing countries have
been supporting these firms by providing capital contributions and/or loans with low in-
terest rates.3 These policies aim to encourage investment in the search for and acquisition
of new mines by domestic final goods producers with a view to achieving stable resource
procurement at low prices.
Using a simple two-period model, this paper examines the effects of the acquisition of
mines/resources by a final goods producer (home firm) located in a resource-importing
1See, for example, the Minerals Yearbook by the United States Geological Survey (USGS)
(http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/myb.html) and Strategic Metal Investments Ltd. (SMI Ltd.)
(http://www.strategic-metal.com/index.php/news/content/chinas minor metals part1).
2Hereafter, we omit “intermediate” and use only “final goods” for simplicity.
3See, for example, Challenges and Actions in Economic/Industrial Policies by the Ministry of Econ-
omy, Trade and Industry (http://www.meti.go.jp/english/aboutmeti/policy/fy2012/fy2012policies.pdf)
and the United States Department of Energy (http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/piprod/documents/US-
Japan REE Meeting.pdf).
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country (home country) on resource prices in both the first (the present) and second
(the future) periods, profits of firms, and welfare. In particular, we focus on a scenario
in which support by the home government encourages investment in the acquisition of
mines/resources by the home firm.4 We also distinguish resource-importing countries from
a resource-exporting country, and consider the welfare effects for both types of countries.
To this end, we introduce three important features into our model. First, we assume
that there is only one resource-extracting firm located in the resource-exporting country
in the first period, although the home firm also owns its own mines and extracts resources
in the second period. In contrast, there are many final goods producers that use the
resource as input. Thus, the resource-extracting firm has the power to determine the
resource price in each period. Second, the amount of investment in exploration by the
home firm is determined before the first period begins, but the resource can only be
extracted in the second period. This setting is representative of the real world, in which
it is usually time consuming to explore and acquire new mines. Third, we consider the
stock-dependent cost for extraction by the resource-extracting firm (i.e., the variable cost
in the second period is higher than in the first period).
Using a cartel-versus-fringe model, Salant (1976) derived equilibrium price and sales
paths using a Nash-Cournot approach. He demonstrated that the competitive fringe
completes its sales first, although it may benefit from the formation of a cartel. Ulph
and Folie (1980) extended the model to the case where firms’ costs are heterogeneous.5
In our model, a competitive fringe exists only in the future period. In this respect, our
model is related to that of Gilbert and Goldman (1978). They examined the situation in
which potential entrants exist and found that potential competition increases the present
resource price set by a monopolist and the entry of competitors is delayed.6 However,
they did not explicitly consider the demand/supply and market structures.
4We mainly use “mines” in the following analysis. However, our analysis can be applied to the case
of oil fields.
5The problem of time-consistency is examined by Groot et al. (2003)
6Agee (2000) extended this analysis into the case of private stock information. In terms of changes
in market structure, Ro¨theli (1995) considered the case where there is a possibility of the market being
cartelized. Moreover, Hillman and Long (1983) examined the situation where there is the possibility of
trade disruption.
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Using an oligopoly model, Sadorsky (1992) investigated the determination of both ex-
ploration and extraction in the two-period model and examined the effects of changes
in the number of firms and quantity tax rate on extraction and exploration. Under a
duopoly, Polasky (1996) also considered exploration, examining the problem of private
information on exploration. Mason (2010) examined privately held stockpiles of minerals
and demonstrated that if extraction costs are stock-dependent and if prices are stochas-
tic and sufficiently volatile, then firms have an incentive to hold inventories in order to
streamline production over time. Teisberg (1981) developed a stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming model and examined the effective stockpile policies of petroleum. Wei et al.
(2008) empirically estimated the optimal strategic petroleum reserve for China. How-
ever, they do not explicitly consider the relationship between the resource-importing and
resource-exporting countries.7
Karp and Newbery(1991, 1992) and Chou and Long (2009) examined the optimal
policies of resource-importing countries. However, they mainly focus on tariff policies.
As far as we know, there are few studies that investigate the price and welfare effects of
the acquisition of new mines on resource prices in both the present and future periods by
explicitly considering the market structure.
We find that an increase in the number of mines owned by the home firm can increase
the resource price in the first period and/or, interestingly, the second period. This finding
implies that the total resource consumption in the first or second period may decrease. The
strategic behavior of a resource-extracting firm located in a resource-exporting country
produces this result. Whether the resource price increases in either period depends on
the demand structure for the final good and the supply condition of the resources for the
home firm in the second period. Moreover, we consider three extended situations. First,
when the home firm and the resource-extracting firm embark on joint exploration, it is
more likely that the resource price in the second period will increase in response to an
increase in investment in new mines by the home firm. Second, when speculators enter
7A body of literature empirically examined the effect of reserve policies on oil prices (see Considine,
2006 and Demirer and Kutan, 2010, for example). They focus on the relatively short run effect on the
oil spot and future markets. Yucel (1994) and Ejarque (2010) also examine the resource reserve policies
of the U.S. and EU respectively.
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the market, the resource prices in both periods change in the same direction. Even in
such a case, under certain conditions, prices may increase because of the acquisition of
new mines by the home firm. Third, we consider a situation in which the home firm
determines its investment amount after the resource-extracting firm chooses the resource
price in the second period. We also discuss the welfare effect of the acquisition of new
mines on the final goods producer.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the basic model
and the equilibrium situation. Section 4 examines the price effects of an increase in the
mines/resources owned by a final goods producer. Section 5 examines the welfare effects,
and Section 6 considers three extended situations. Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
2 The Basic Model
There is only one resource supplier (Firm f), which is located in the resource-exporting
country (Country f). There are n firms that produce final goods X from the resource,
which are located in resource-importing countries. One of those final goods producers
(Firm h) is located in the home country. The final goods producers including Firm h
supply their own products to the integrated world market (see Figure 1 for the structure
of the model).
We consider a simple two-period model. In each period, Firm f determines the resource
price first. Then, each final goods producer chooses its output. Final good producers
compete with each other in a Cournot fashion in the final goods market, while they are
price takers in the resource market.8
Firm h invests in the exploration of mines, and those mines are ready for extraction
when it begins the production of final goods in the second period.9 However, it is assumed
that the amount of extraction from its own mines is smaller than the amount it needs
and, therefore, it also purchases resources from Firm f . Furthermore, we do not consider
8In the real world, the number of consumers is larger than the number of final goods producers, and
the number of final goods producers is generally larger than the number of the resource extracting firms
in the case of industries that use the resource as an input. Therefore, this setting is reasonable.
9Even if all final goods producers own mines, the same results are obtained. For simplicity of notations
and equations, we exclude exploration by other final goods producers.
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the effects of uncertainty on exploration. Thus, an increase in investment in exploration
implies an increase in the acquisition of new mines.
Firm h determines the amount of investment in exploration before the first period be-
gins. This setting reflects an important aspect of mining investments: it is time consuming
to complete the exploration of new mines. We consider that the investment amount is
exogenous when the resource price and outputs are determined in both periods.10
The world inverse demand curve for the final goods in each period is given by
px,j = Px(Xj), P
′
x < 0, j = 1, 2,
the structure of which is fixed through both periods. Xj denotes the total output of final
goods in period j.
One unit of final goods X is made from one unit of the resource, and the marginal cost
for producing the final goods, except for the resource procurement cost, is assumed to be
zero. The profit of each final goods producer i, except for Firm h, in each period is given
by:
pii,j = (px,j − pr,j) · xi,j,
where px,j and pr,j denote the prices of output and the resource in period j (= 1, 2),
respectively. Moreover, xi,j denotes the output of each final goods producer (Firm i) in
period j.
For Firm h, the profits of both periods are given by
pih,2 = (px,2 − pr,2) · xh,2 + pr,2Mh − Ch(Mh, I),
pih,1 = (px,1 − pr,1) · xh,1,
whereMh, Ch, and I denote the amount of extraction by Firm h, the cost of the extraction,
and the investment amount for the exploration/acquisition of mines, respectively. The
10Even when Firm h determines the amount of investment after the resource prices in both periods are
chosen by Firm f , similar results are obtained. However, an additional factor that affects the strategic
behavior of Firm f in choosing the resource prices can be observed. We will refer to this situation in
Subsection 6.3.
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larger the investment is, the more mines Firm h owns in the second period.11 We assume
that ∂Ch/∂Mh > 0, ∂
2Ch/∂M
2
h > 0, ∂Ch/∂I < 0, ∂
2Ch/∂I
2 > 0, and ∂2Ch/∂I∂Mh < 0.
The objective of the final goods producers is to maximize their own profits in each
period. Because they are price takers in the resource market, and because none of them
have any mines in the first period, they do not consider the effect of their own production
in the first period on the resource price in the second period.
We assume that the cost for the resource extracting activity of Firm f is stock depen-
dent. Therefore, the marginal cost curve shifts upward in the second period as compared
with the first period. The larger the amount of the extraction in the first period, the
greater the shift is. In particular, for the total extraction through the two periods (Rs),
the total cost is defined as:
TCr = Cf (Rs), C
′
f > 0, C
′′
f > 0.
Thus, the cost function for each period is given by:
Cf,1 = Cf (R1), Cf,2 = Cf (R2 +R1)− Cf (R1),
where Rj (j = 1, 2) denotes the amount of extraction in period j. Note that R1 is given
at the beginning of the second period.
The profit of Firm f in each period is given by:
pif,1 = pr,1R1 − Cf,1(R1),
pif,2 = pr,2R2 − Cf,2(R2 +R1) + Cf,1(R1).
In the second period, Firm f chooses the resource price (pr,2) to maximize pif,2. In contrast
to final goods producers, it considers the effect of its choice of resource price in the first
period on the situation in the second period. Therefore, Firm f chooses the resource price
11The total profit of Firm h is given by
pih,1 − CI(I, s) + δpih,2,
where CI , s, and δ denote the investment cost, the support by the home government for exploration,
such as subsidies, and a discount factor, respectively. We will refer to this total profit when discussing
home welfare in Section 5.
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in the first period to maximize the total profit:12
Πf = pif,1 + δpif,2,
where δ is the discount factor. We consider that the discount rate is equal to the interest
rate, and accordingly the interest rate is indicated by (1− δ)/δ.
We consider a general demand curve for the final goods. Therefore, the rate of increase
in the optimal resource price for Firm f may be greater than the interest rate. Even
in such a case, Firm f is able to choose the resource prices in both periods, if Firm f
can prohibit final goods producers from reselling resources to other players, and/or if it
is costly for speculators to enter the resource market because of transaction and storage
costs. However, in the real world, speculators can enter many resource markets with low
entry costs. Therefore, we also consider the case where speculators enter the resource
market (in Subsection 6.2), and accordingly, the rate of an increase in the resource price
is equal to the interest rate.
The home government may support Firm h’s new mine exploration, such as through a
subsidy. This support is exogenous in our model, and it is assumed that the government’s
support always increases the investment in exploration by Firm h.
3 Equilibrium Prices and Extraction
We solve the game by backward induction, and the notion of equilibrium is the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium (see Figure 2 for the structure of the game).
3.1 The Second Period
Final goods producers including Firm h choose outputs to maximize their own profits
given the resource price, pr,2. The first-order condition (FOC) for each producer is
∂pii,2
∂xi,2
= px,2 + P
′
x,2xi,2 − pr,2 = 0, (1)
12If we consider that Firm f simultaneously chooses the resource prices in both periods so that the
total profit (Πf ) is maximized, the same equilibrium prices are obtained. However, for clarity of the
description of processes and equations, we choose the two step determination of resource prices.
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where P ′x,2 = P
′
x(X2). The second-order condition (SOC) is assumed to hold globally:
∂2pii,2/∂x
2
i,2 < 0. Because final goods producers are symmetric except for the acquisition
of mines, equilibrium outputs are the same. We define the equilibrium outputs: xˆi,2 =
xˆ2 = xˆ2(pr,2), and Xˆ2 = Xˆ2(pr,2).
13 Then, the FOC ((1)) can be rewritten as
Px(nxˆ2) + P
′
x(nxˆ2)xˆ2 − pr,2 = 0.
The following stability condition is assumed to hold globally: (n + 1)P ′x,2 + nP
′′
x,2x2 < 0,
where P
′′
x,2 = P
′′
x (X2). Therefore, ∂xˆ2/∂pr,2 < 0 and ∂Xˆ2/∂pr,2 < 0 hold.
Firm h also extracts the resource from mines it owns. Because Firm h is a price taker
in the resource market, the amount of extraction is determined so that the marginal
extraction cost is equal to the resource price: pr,2 = ∂Ch/∂Mh. Thus, we obtain the
equilibrium amount of extraction: Mˆh(pr,2, I). Note that it follows from the assumption
on the shape of Ch that ∂Mˆh/∂I > 0 and ∂Mˆh/∂pr,2 > 0.
The demand for the resource extracted by Firm f is given by RD,2(pr,2, I) = Xˆ2(pr,2)−
Mˆh(pr,2, I). From the shape of the demand and supply curves (Xˆ2, Mˆh), it holds that
∂RD,2/∂pr,2 < 0. Firm f chooses the resource price in the second period to maximize its
profit (pif,2). The FOC is
∂pif,2
∂pr,2
= RD,2 + (pr,2 − C ′f,2) ·
∂RD,2
∂pr,2
= 0. (2)
The SOC is assumed to be satisfied:
∂2pif,2
∂p2r,2
= 2
∂RD,2
∂pr,2
− C ′′f,2
(
∂RD,2
∂pr,2
)2
+ (pr,2 − C ′f,2) ·
∂2RD,2
∂p2r,2
< 0. (3)
Thus, we obtain the equilibrium resource price and the supply of the resource by Firm f
in the second period: pˆr,2(R1, I), Rˆ2 = RD,2(pˆr,2, I).
3.2 The First Period
The determination of the output quantities of final goods is the same as that in the
second period. On the other hand, because Firm h has not yet completed the acquisition
of mines, it does not extract resources itself, and accordingly, RD,1 is equal to Xˆ1(pr,1).
13These equilibrium variables also depend on the number of final goods producers, n. However, because
it does not play any role in our analysis, we omit n from these functions.
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Firm f chooses the resource price in the first period to maximize its total profit:
Πf = pr,1RD,1 − Cf,1(RD,1) + δpˆif,2,
where pˆif,2 denotes the equilibrium profit in the second period given R1. Using the envelope
theorem, the FOC is given by:
dΠf
dpr,1
= RD,1 +
{
pr,1 − (1− δ)C ′f,1 − δC ′f,2
} · ∂RD,1
∂pr,1
= 0, (4)
where ∂RD,1/∂pr,1 = ∂Xˆ1/∂pr,1. For an interior solution for each period to be obtained,
the following inequality is assumed to hold.
Assumption 1
pr,1 − (1− δ)C ′f,1 − δC ′f,2 > 0.
Intuitively, Assumption 1 implies that the resource is abundant in the mines owned by
Firm f , and accordingly, the marginal cost of extraction for Firm f does not drastically
increase. Moreover, the SOC is assumed to be satisfied.14 Thus, we obtain the equilibrium
resource price and extraction amount in the first period: pˆr,1(I), Rˆ1 = RD,1(pˆr,1).
4 Acquisition of New Mines and Resource Prices
When the home government supports the investments of Firm h, the exploration/acquisition
of mines is expected to increase. In this section, we examine the effect of an increase in
mines owned by Firm h on the resource prices in both periods.
There are two kinds of effects on resource prices: the direct price effect and the supply-
shifting effect. The direct price effect, which is denoted by ∂pˆr,2/∂I, is the effect of an
increase in mines owned by Firm h on the resource price in the second period given the
resource supply by Firm f in the first period (R1).
From (2), we obtain:
∂2pˆif,2
∂I∂pr,2
= −∂Mˆh
∂I
+ C
′′
f,2
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
∂Mˆh
∂I
− (pˆr,2 − C ′f,2)
∂2Mˆh
∂I∂pr,2
. (5)
14Precisely, the SOC is:
d2Πf
dp2r,1
= 2R′D,1 + (pr,1 − (1− δ)C ′f,1 − δC ′f,2) ·R
′′
D,1 − ((1− δ)C
′′
f,1 + δC
′′
f,2) ·R
′2
D,1 − δC
′′
f,2R
′
D,1
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,1
< 0,
where ∂Rˆ2/∂pr,1 = ∂Rˆ2/∂pr,2 · ∂pˆr,2/∂RD,1 ·R′D,1.
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Because ∂Rˆ2/∂pr,2 < 0 and ∂Mˆh/∂I > 0 hold, we record the following result on the direct
price effect.
Lemma 1
If ∂2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 > 0, ∂pˆr,2/∂I < 0 holds. This means that an increase in the investment
in new mines by Firm h decreases the resource price in the second period through the
direct price effect.
∂2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 > 0 means that, the greater amount of mines Firm h owns, the greater is
its response to an increase in pr,2 by increasing extraction. In other words, the higher
the resource price offered by Firm f in the second period is, the greater the effect of an
additional unit of investment on the increase in the extraction by Firm h. The shift of
the supply curve that satisfies this inequality is shown in Figure 3. As the investment
amount increases, the demand for the resource supplied by Firm f becomes more elastic,
which gives Firm f an incentive to lower the resource price in the second period.
Now let us turn to the supply-shifting effect. Observing a change in the investment
amount by Firm h and expecting a change in the second-period situation, Firm f increases
or decreases the resource supply in each period. In other words, Firm f shifts the resource
supply from the first (second) period to the second (first) period to maximize its profit.
This effect is given by ∂pˆr,2/∂R1 · Rˆ′1 · dpˆr,1/dI, where Rˆ′1 denotes ∂Rˆ1/∂pr,1. Contrary to
the direct price effect, the supply-shifting effect changes the resource prices in both the
first and second periods.
We obtain from (4) that
d2Πˆf
dIdpr,1
= −δC ′′f,2
dR˜2
dI
R′1, (6)
where
dR˜2
dI
=
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
∂pˆr,2
∂I
− ∂Mˆh
∂I
. (7)
dR˜/dI denotes the effect of a change in the investment by Firm h on the demand for the
resource supplied by Firm f given the resource supply in the first period (R1). Thus, the
supply-shifting effect can be rewritten as
∂pˆr,2
∂R1
· Rˆ′1 ·
dpˆr,1
dI
=
∂pˆr,2
∂R1
· Rˆ′1 ·
δC
′′
f,2Rˆ
′
1
dR˜2
dI
d2Πˆf
dp2r,1
. (8)
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From (2), we obtain:
∂2pˆif,2
∂R1∂pr,2
= −C ′′f,2
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
> 0. (9)
Because ∂Rˆ2/∂pr,2 < 0, ∂pˆr,2/∂R1 > 0 holds. Moreover, Rˆ
′
1 < 0 and C
′′
f,2 > 0 hold. Thus,
the supply-shifting effect depends on the sign of dR˜2/dI.
Lemma 2
If dR˜2/dI < 0 (resp. dR˜2/dI > 0 ), an increase in the investment in new mines by Firm
h decreases (resp. increases) the resource price in the first period, and increases (resp.
decreases) the resource price in the second period through the supply-shifting effect.
When the direct price effect is negative (∂pˆr,2/∂I < 0), dR˜2/dI can be either negative or
positive. Because ∂Rˆ2/∂pr,2 < 0, the price decrease in the second period increases the
demand for the resource extracted by Firm f given the amount of extraction of Firm h
(the first term in (7)). On the other hand, an increase in investment by Firm h increases
the resource supply of Firm h given the resource price, which means that the demand
for the resource extracted by Firm f decreases (the second term in (7)). Thus, dR˜2/dI
is either positive or negative. However, when the direct effect is positive (∂pˆr,2/∂I > 0),
both terms work to decrease the demand for the resource extracted by Firm f . In this
case, dR˜2/dI is necessarily negative.
From (3) and (5), it is obtained that
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
∂pˆr,2
∂I
=
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
− C ′′f,2
(
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
)2
+ (pˆr,2 − C ′f,2) ∂
2Mˆh
∂I∂pr,2
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
/∂Mˆh
∂I
2 ∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
− C ′′f,2
(
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
)2
+ (pr,2 − C ′f,2) · ∂
2Rˆ2
∂p2r,2
· ∂Mˆh
∂I
.
Thus, recalling that ∂Rˆ2/∂pr,2 < 0, the more highly the demand for the resource supplied
by Firm f is convex (∂2Rˆ2/∂p
2
r,2 > 0), the more likely it is that dR˜2/dI > 0 hold (see (7)).
It should be noted that even if the demand curve for final goods is concave, the demand
for the resource supplied by Firm f can be convex because Rˆ2 = Xˆ2 − Mˆh. Moreover,
even if ∂2Rˆ2/∂p
2
r,2 < 0, dR˜2/dI > 0 may hold.
From Lemmas 1 and 2, we obtain the effects of a change in the investment in the
exploration/acquisition of new mines by Firm h on the resource prices in both periods.
Depending on the direction and the size of both the direct price and the supply-shifting
effects, there are four possible cases.
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First, when ∂2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 > 0 and dR˜2/dI > 0, both the direct price and the supply-
shifting effects decrease the resource price in the second period, and the latter increases
it in the first period.
Proposition 1
Suppose that ∂2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 > 0 and dR˜2/dI > 0 hold. Then, an increase in the mines
owned by Firm h increases the resource price in the first period, and decreases it in the
second period.
It is interesting to consider the policy implication of this result. Suppose that the support
by the home government for the investment by Firm h increases the amount of investment.
In such a case, the government’s support may induce an increase in the present resource
price.
Next, when ∂2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 > 0 and dR˜2/dI < 0, the direct price effect decreases
the resource price in the second period, while the supply-shifting effect increases (resp.
decreases) the resource price in the second (resp. first) period. As far as the resource price
in the second period, both effects conflict with each other. Thus, depending on the sizes
of both effects, there are two possible cases. Recalling that Rˆ1 = Xˆ(pˆr,1), we establish
the following result.
Proposition 2
Suppose that ∂2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 > 0 and dR˜2/dI < 0 holds. If the demand curve for final
goods is concave (Rˆ′′1 < 0), an increase in the mines owned by Firm h necessarily decreases
the resource prices both in the first and second periods. On the other hand, if the demand
curve for final goods is convex (R′′1 > 0), an increase in the mines owned by Firm h may
increase the resource price in the second period.
See Appendix A for the proof.
The intuition is as follows. When ∂2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 > 0, an investment in the exploration
of new mines by Firm h makes the demand for the resource extracted by Firm f more
elastic. Thus, in terms of the direct price effect, Firm f has an incentive to decrease the
resource price in the second period, and accordingly, increase the supply in the second
period. However, as noted above, the supply-shifting effect is assumed to work to increase
the resource price in the second period. Then, which effect dominates the other depends
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on the shape of the demand curve for final goods. When the demand curve for final
goods is concave, ∂pr,1/∂R1 becomes greater as the supply in the first period increases.
On the other hand, when the demand curve for final goods is convex, ∂pr,1/∂R1 becomes
smaller as the supply in the first period increases. Therefore, Firm f has less incentive to
shift the resource supply from the second to the first periods when the demand curve for
final goods is concave than when it is convex. Consequently, when the demand curve is
concave, the direct price effect necessarily dominates the supply-shifting effect, whereas
when the demand curve is convex, the supply-shifting effect may dominate the direct price
effect.
Let us now turn to the case where ∂2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 < 0 holds. This case is possible
when considering investments in resources. For example, consider the exploration of oil
fields in a certain area. The resource extraction increases given the resource price as the
number of pits/platforms increases by investments. However, because the oil reserve in
a certain area is finite, an additional pit/platform gives rise to negative externalities in
the extraction of existing pits/platforms in the same area. In such a case, the marginal
cost of extraction rapidly increases when the stock becomes small. Thus, an additional
investment may decrease the marginal increase of extraction in response to an increase
in the resource price. This type of shift of a supply curve is depicted in Figure 4. In
this case, it follows from (5) that a decrease in the resource price in the second period
is smaller when ∂2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 < 0 than when ∂
2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 > 0. An increase in the
investment may even increase the resource price in the second period. This is because the
demand for the resource supplied by Firm f becomes less elastic. In particular, from (7)
and (8), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3
If the direct price effect is positive (∂pˆr,2/∂I > 0), an increase in the mines owned by
Firm h necessarily increases the resource price in the second period, and decreases it in
the first period.
Both the direct price and supply-shifting effects work in the same direction with respect
to the price in the second period. The resource supply by Firm f in the second period
decreases, while that in the first period increases.
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One point should be emphasized. The result obtained in the case of ∂2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 < 0
is specific to the effect of an investment in resource exploration. It follows from (5) that
the necessary condition for ∂pˆr,2/∂I > 0 to hold is ∂
2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 < 0. And, this inequality
is specific to the shift of a resource supply curve as a result of investment in exploration.
Having examined the effects of an increase in mines owned by Firm h on the resource
prices, we obtain important policy implications. The support by the government of a
resource-importing country does not necessarily have an effect on the resource price as
intended, if the government aims to lower the resource price. In some cases, the support
leads to an increase in the present resource price, and in other cases it may lead to an
increase in the future resource price.
The comparison between our results and those obtained under a continuous infinite-
horizon model (Gilbert and Goldman (1978)) is interesting. In a continuous infinite-
horizon model, demand and supply structures are simplified. And, it is obtained that an
increase in the possibility of entry of competitive suppliers gives a monopolist an incentive
to decrease the present extraction. This behavior leads to delays in the depletion of the
stock owned by the monopolist and accordingly delays the entry. Observing the changes
in prices, Proposition 1 seems to produce a similar result. However, the reasons for the
price increase in the present period(s) are different. In Gilbert and Goldman (1978), by
the increase in the present price, the entry in a certain future period is less attractive
for a potential entrant. In contrast, in our analysis, the timing and the scale of entry
is predetermined when the monopolist chooses the present resource price. Depending on
the demand and supply structure, the monopolist may shift the supply from the present
period(s) to the future period(s). When considering the case where Firm h determines
the investment amount in the second period, we obtain a similar effect as Gilbert and
Goldman (1978) (see Subsection 6.3).
5 Welfare
Having examined the price effects, we now investigate the welfare effect of an increase in
mines owned by Firm h: the sum of the consumer surplus and the profit of firms. In this
section, we assume the constant elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand curve for
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final goods.
Assumption 2
−P ′′xX/P ′x =  = const.
When the inverse demand curve is concave (resp. convex),  is negative (resp. positive).
The effect of a change in the investment amount on each factor of welfare is as follows.
First, the consumer surplus of country i in period j (j = 1, 2) is defined as: CSi,j =
βi
∫ Xj
0
Px,j(z)dz(j = 1, 2), where βi denotes the ratio of the market scale of country i to
the scale of the whole world market. Differentiating the consumer surplus in period j
with respect to I yields:
dCSi,j
dI
= βhpˆr,j
dXˆj
dpr,j
dpˆr,j
dI
= βhpˆr,j
n
Pˆ ′x,j(n+ 1− )
dpˆr,j
dI
. (10)
It is clear that, the lower the resource price, accordingly, the lower is the price of the final
good, and the greater is the consumer surplus.
Second, the effect of a change in the investment amount on the profit of each final
goods producer from the supply of final goods is given by
dpˆiFGi,j
dI
=
− 2
n+ 1−  · xˆj ·
dpˆr,j
dI
, j = 1, 2, (11)
where superscript FG denotes the profit from the supply of final goods. Except for pˆih,2,
pˆiFGi,j = pˆii,j holds. This derivative states that, when  < 2 (resp.  > 2), a decrease (resp.
an increase) in the resource price increases the profit of firm i from the supply of final
goods.
Third, using the envelope theorem, the effect on the profit from extraction of Firm h
in the second period is given by
dpˆiMh,2
dI
= Mˆh
dpˆr,2
dI
− ∂Ch
∂I
, (12)
where superscript M denotes the profit from the extraction. Because ∂Ch/∂I < 0, if
dpˆr,2/dI > 0, dpˆi
M
h,2/dI is necessarily positive. From (11) and (12), even if dpˆr,2/dI < 0,
when  < 2, d(pˆiFGh,2 + pˆi
M
h,2)/dI may be positive. In particular, it is likely to hold when the
demand of Firm h for the resource is greater than its own supply/extraction.
We can also consider the total profit of Firm h, which is given by
Πh = pih,1 − CI(I, s) + δpih,2,
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where CI denotes the investment cost. It is assumed that ∂CI/∂I > 0. Therefore, the
effect of a change in the investment on the total profit of Firm h is ambiguous. The effect
on the profit of Firm f is given by
dΠˆf
dI
= −δ(pˆr,2 − C ′r,2)
∂Mˆh
∂I
< 0. (13)
Now let us consider home welfare. The effect of an increase in mine investment by Firm
h on home welfare depends on whether the investment amount is optimal in terms of the
profits of Firm h in the case of no support from the government. In the real world, there
are risks of failing in the acquisition of new mines. In such a case, without government
support, the investment amount is likely to be smaller than the optimum in terms of the
profits of Firm h, which implies that dΠh/dI > 0. In this case, if ∂
2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 > 0,
 < 0, and dR˜/dI < 0 hold, the home government’s support encourages Firm h to
invest in exploration and improves home welfare. This is because the resource prices in
both periods decrease when these conditions are satisfied and, accordingly, the consumer
surplus necessarily increases in both periods (see Proposition 2). This implies that when
the firm’s investment is insufficient because of risks, the government’s support can achieve
its goal: the procurement of resources at low prices and the improvement of welfare.
We should note that even if the investment by Firm h is insufficient in terms of the
total profit of Firm h in the case of no government’s support, it is possible that the
support could deteriorate home welfare. When the resource price increases either in the
first or second period, the consumer surplus in that period decreases. Therefore, home
welfare may be reduced in that period. Consequently, depending on the time preference
of consumers, total home welfare may decrease in response to an increase in investment
by Firm h.
What is the effect on other resource-importing countries? Because other final goods
producers are assumed not to invest in exploration, if ∂2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 > 0,  < 0, and
dR˜/dI < 0 hold, an increase in the investment amount by Firm h improves the welfare of
other resource-importing countries. In this case, the investment is likely to be insufficient
in terms of the total welfare of resource-importing countries because the home government
does not take into consideration the positive effect on welfare of other countries. On
the other hand, in other cases, other resource-importing countries may lose from the
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investment by Firm h through an increase in the resource price, because the consumer
surplus in those countries decreases. In such a case, the investment in exploration by a
final goods producer may be excessive in terms of the maximization of the total welfare
of resource-importing countries.
Finally, we examine the welfare of the resource-exporting country. It follows from (13)
that an increase in the investment of a final goods producer always works against the profit
of Firm f . However, if the market scale of the foreign country is large, consumers benefit
from the decrease in the price of final goods. Thus, the effect on the resource-exporting
country depends on its relative market scale.
6 Extensions
In this section, we investigate three extended situations: joint exploration, entry of specu-
lators, and the case in which Firm h chooses the investment amount after Firm f chooses
the resource price in the second period (the non-commitment case).
6.1 Joint Exploration
We have so far assumed that Firm h receives all of the gains from exploration. This
assumption fits for the case in which undeveloped deposits exist in the jurisdiction of
the home country. In general, however, many types of resources are unevenly distributed
across a small number of countries in the real world. Firm h may have to purchase the
right of exploration/extraction for a mine located outside of the jurisdiction of the home
country. In such a case, it is likely that the resource-exporting country will receive a part
of the gains from extraction.
In this subsection, we consider a case in which the following conditions hold: (a) all
deposits are owned by Firm f , (b) some of them have not been developed, and (c) Firm
f and Firm h jointly embark on the development of a new mine.15 Then, they share the
profit from extracting resources from the new mine. In such a case, Firm f chooses the
15If Firm h has some advanced technologies, Firm f may have an incentive to embark on joint explo-
ration.
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resource prices in both periods to maximize its profit, which includes a part of the joint
profit:
ΠJf = Πf + δθ(pr,2Mh − Ch(Mh, I)),
where θ is the share of Firm f , and superscript J denotes the case of joint exploration.
In this case, the FOC ((2)) can be rewritten as
∂pif,2
∂pr,2
= R2 + (pr,2 − C ′f,2) ·
∂R2
∂pr,2
+ θMˆh = 0. (14)
Accordingly, (5) can be rewritten as
∂2pˆif,2
∂I∂pr,2
= −(1− θ)∂Mˆh
∂I
+ C
′′
f,2
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
∂Mˆh
∂I
− (pˆr,2 − C ′f,2)
∂2Mˆh
∂I∂pr,2
. (15)
Because ∂Mˆh/∂I > 0, we obtain that, given the resource price in the first period, Firm
f has less incentive to decrease the resource price in the second period in response to an
increase in the investment by Firm h when exploration is a joint project than when Firm
h explores by itself. In other words, the higher the share of Firm f in the profit of a new
mine, the less likely it is that the resource price in the second period decreases. It can
also be said that if ∂2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 < 0, the direct price effect is more likely to be positive
when exploration is a joint project than when Firm h does the exploration itself.
Moreover, if both the direct price and supply-shifting effects conflict with each other
with respect to the resource price in the second period, it is more likely that the latter
effect dominates the former when exploration is a joint project than when Firm h explores
by itself (See Appendix B for the detail). Thus, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4
It is more likely that an increase in the mines owned by Firm h increases the resource price
in the second period when the home government increases support for the joint project
than when it increases the support for independent exploration.
6.2 Entry of Speculators
We have so far implicitly assumed that Firm f can choose the resource prices in both
periods. However, speculators may be able to enter the resource market. In particular,
when the demand curve for final goods is convex, it is possible that the rate of an increase
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in the optimal price for Firm f is greater than the interest rate. Accordingly, if speculators
can enter the resource market without any entry costs, pr,2 = pr,2/δ holds. In this case,
the objective of Firm f is to maximize Πf subject to pr,2 = pr,1/δ. In other words, Firm
f cannot choose the resource price in the second period independent of that in the first
period. Then, the FOC is given by
dΠf
dpr,1
= RD,1 +
{
pr,1 − (1− δ)C ′f,1 − δC ′f,2
} · ∂RD,1
∂pr,1
+ δ ·
(
R2
δ
+
pr,2 − C ′f,2
δ
· ∂R2
∂pr,2
)
= 0. (16)
We also assume that the SOC holds. Then, it follows from (16) that
d2Πf
dIdpr,1
= −δC ′′f,2
dRˆ2
dI
R′1 −
∂Mˆh
∂I
+ C
′′
f,2
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
∂Mˆh
∂I
− (pˆSr,2 − C ′f,2)
∂2Mˆh
∂I∂pr,2
. (17)
Note that this is the case when Firm h explores the new mines itself (θ = 0).
It seems to be the same as the case when Firm f can choose the resource price in
each period. However, in the present situation, dR˜2/dI = −dMˆh/dI < 0, which is
different from (7), because Firm f cannot choose the resource price in the second period
independent of that in the first period. Thus, if ∂2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 > 0 holds, (17) is necessarily
negative.
Proposition 5
When speculators enter the resource market, if ∂2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 > 0 holds, an increase in
mines owned by Firm h necessarily decreases the resource prices in both periods.
In this case, the possibility of entry of speculators can prevent the resource price from
increasing as a result of the strategic behavior of Firm f in response to an increase in the
exploration of Firm h.
However, as noted in the previous section, it is possible that ∂2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 < 0 holds.
In such a case, the last term in (17) results in the resource price increasing in both periods.
In particular, this is likely to take place when C ′′f,2 is small. Moreover, it follows from the
analysis in the previous subsection that joint exploration increases this possibility.
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6.3 The Non-commitment Case
It is possible to consider a situation in which Firm f chooses resource prices before Firm
h determines its investment amount, if we consider a long-term horizon. We refer to this
case as the non-commitment case. In particular, the structure of the game in the second
period is assumed to be as follows: First, Firm f determines the resource price; second,
Firm h chooses the amount of investment in exploration/acquisition; and third, Firm h
chooses the amounts of extraction; and fourth, final goods producers choose the amounts
of their own outputs.
The profit functions in the non-commitment case are given by
pih,2 = (px,2 − pr,2) · xi,2 + pr,2Mh − Ch(Mh, I)− CI(I, s),
pih,1 = (px,1 − pr,1) · xi,1.
It is assumed that ∂CI/∂I > 0, ∂CI/∂s < 0, ∂
2CI/∂I
2 > 0, ∂2CI/∂s∂I < 0. The
third and fourth steps are the same as the former case (Section 3), and we obtain the
equilibrium outputs and the amount of extraction by Firm h given I and pr,2.
Firm h chooses the amount of exploration given the resource price offered by Firm f .
Using the envelope theorem, the FOC is given by:
dpih,2
dI
= −∂Ch
∂I
− ∂CI
∂I
= 0. (18)
The SOC is assumed to hold:
d2pih,2
dI2
= −∂
2Ch
∂I2
− ∂
2Ch
∂I∂Mh
∂Mh
∂I
− ∂
2CI
∂I2
< 0.
Thus, we obtain the equilibrium amount of exploration: Iˆ(pr,2). Moreover, we obtain that
d2pih,2
dIdpr,2
= − ∂
2Ch
∂I∂Mh
∂Mh
∂pr,2
> 0.
Thus, dIˆ/dpr,2 > 0 holds.
Taking into consideration the effect of a change in the resource price on the exploration
amount and outputs, Firm f chooses the resource price for the second period. The demand
for the resource extracted by Firm f is given by: RD,2(pr,2, I) = Xˆ2(pr,2) − Mˆh(pr,2, I),
and the FOC is
∂pif,2
∂pr,2
= R2 + (pr,2 − C ′r,2) ·
(
∂R2
∂pr,2
− ∂Mh
∂I
dI
dpr,2
)
= 0. (19)
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We also assume that the SOC is satisfied.16 Thus, we obtain the equilibrium resource price
and the supply of the resource by Firm f in the second period: pˆr,2(R1), Rˆ2 = RD,2(pˆr,2, Iˆ).
Note that the situation in the first period is the same as that in the former case (see
Subsection 3.2): i.e., Firm f chooses the resource price first, and final goods producers
chooses their own output quantities. Therefore, the FOCs for the final goods producers
and Firm h are also the same as those in the former case.
It follows from (18) that d2pih,2/dIds > 0. Thus, given the resource price in the second
period, an increase in support by the home government increases the exploration of mines
by Firm h. On the other hand, the effect of an increase in the support on the resource
price is ambiguous. From (4) and (19), it is obtained that:
∂2pif,2
∂pr,2∂s
= −∂Mh
∂I
∂I
∂s
·
{
−1 + C ′′f,2
(
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
− ∂Mˆh
∂I
∂I
∂pr,2
)}
− (pr,2 − C ′r,2) ·
(
∂2Mˆh
∂pr,2∂I
∂I
∂s
+
∂2Mˆh
∂I2
∂I
∂s
∂I
∂pr,2
+
∂Mˆh
∂I
∂2I
∂pr,2∂s
)
, (20)
d2Πf,1
∂pr,1∂s
= −δR′1C ′′r,2
{
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
∂pr,2
∂s
− ∂Mh
∂I
(
∂I
∂pr,2
∂pr,2
∂s
+
∂I
∂s
)}
. (21)
In (20), only the second term in the parentheses in the second line increases the resource
price in response to an increase in the government’s support. However, all of the other
terms decrease the resource price. Therefore, in general, it is likely that the support by
the home government for the exploration of Firm h lowers the resource price in the second
period given the resource price in the first period.
When focusing on (21), we find an additional term as compared with (6): ∂I/∂pr,2 ·
∂pr,2/∂s. This term is negative if ∂pr,2/∂s < 0. In such a case, it gives Firm f an
incentive to increase the resource price in the first period in response to an increase in the
support of the home government for Firm h. The reason is that Firm f can discourage the
investment in exploration by Firm h by increasing the resource price in the first period,
which means that the extraction cost of Firm f in the second period becomes lower and
16Precisely, the SOC is given by:
∂2pif,2
∂p2r,2
= 2
∂RD,2
∂pr,2
− C ′′r,2
(
∂RD,2
∂pr,2
)2
+ (pr,2 − C ′r,2) ·
(
∂2RD,2
∂p2r,2
− ∂
2Mh
∂pr,2∂I
dI
dpr,2
− ∂Mh
∂I
d2I
dp2r,2
)
< 0.
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the marginal benefit of investment of Firm h becomes smaller.
In total, it is more likely in the non-commitment case that the resource price in the
first period increases than in the former case in Section 4.
7 Conclusion
Assuming a simple two-period model, we examine the effects of the acquisition of mines
by a home final goods producer on the resource prices in both the first period (the present
period) and the second period (the future period), profits of firms, and welfare. We also
consider three extended situations: joint exploration, the existence of speculators, and
the non-committed investment.
We find that an increase in the mines owned by the home firm can increase the resource
price in the first period and/or, interestingly, that in the second period. This implies that
the total resource consumption in the first or second period may decrease. The strategic
behavior of a resource extracting firm located in a resource-exporting country produces
this result. Whether or not the resource price increases in either period depends on the
demand structure for final goods and the supply condition of the resource by the home
firm in the second period. Moreover, we obtain the following results from the analysis on
extended situations. First, when the home firm and the resource-extracting firm embark
on joint exploration, it is more likely that the resource price in the second period will
increase in response to an increase in mines owned by the home firm. Second, when
speculators enter the market, the resource prices in both periods change in the same
direction. Even in such a case, under certain conditions, they can increase in response
to the acquisition of new mines by the home firm. Third, it is more likely in the non-
commitment case that the resource price in the first period increases than in the case in
which Firm h determines the investment amount before the first period begins.
We did not consider three interesting points specific to this kind of resource issue. First,
there is often uncertainty surrounding the result of investments in new mines. There is
also uncertainty regarding the future demand for final goods/resources and, accordingly,
resource prices. These uncertainties can influence the behavior of firms. Second, the
governments of resource-exporting countries also behave strategically in the real world.
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For example, they sometimes restrict the export of resources, or levy taxes on exploitation.
Alternatively, they may set the price menu of a mine so that they acquire all of the gains
that accrue to the home country. In such a case, the home government’s support merely
benefits the foreign country. Third, we did not consider a scenario in which the resource-
extracting firm sets different prices for different final goods producers. In the real world,
a resource-extracting firm negotiates for the selling price with each final goods producer.
Thus, a final goods producer may gain another benefit from an investment in exploration:
it may be able to purchase resources from the resource-extracting firm at a lower price
than other final goods producers do. These factors also affect the firms’ behavior and the
resource market. The investigation of these points is ripe for future research.
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Appendix A: Proof for Proposition 2
From (4), d2Πf/dp
2
r,1 is written as follows:
d2Πf
dp2r,1
= (2−(1−δ)C ′′f,1Rˆ′1)Rˆ′1+(pr,1−(1−δ)C ′f,1−δC ′f,2)Rˆ
′′
1−δC
′′
f,2Rˆ
′2
1 (1+
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
∂pˆr,2
∂R1
). (22)
Moreover, from (7), the supply-shifting effect ((8)) can be rewritten as
∂pˆr,2
∂I
· δC
′′
f,2Rˆ
′2
1
Λ
·
(
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
∂pˆr,2
∂R1
− ∂Mˆh/∂I · ∂pˆr,2/∂R1
∂pˆr,2/∂I
)
. (23)
From (5) and (9), we obtain that
−∂Mˆh/∂I · ∂pˆr,2/∂R1
∂pˆr,2/∂I
=
C
′′
f,2
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
∂Mˆh
∂I
−∂Mˆh
∂I
+ C
′′
f,2
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
∂Mˆh
∂I
− (pˆr,2 − C ′f,2) ∂
2Mˆh
∂I∂pr,2
. (24)
Thus, because ∂2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 > 0 is assumed, it holds that
0 < −∂Mˆh/∂I · ∂pˆr,2/∂R1
∂pˆr,2/∂I
< 1.
If dRˆ2/dI < 0, it holds that
0 <
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
∂pˆr,2
∂R1
− ∂Mˆh/∂I · ∂pˆr,2/∂R1
∂pˆr,2/∂I
< 1 +
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
∂pˆr,2
∂R1
. (25)
Equations from (22) through (25) state that the absolute value of (23) is smaller than
that of the direct price effect (∂pˆr,2/∂I), if R
′′
1 < 0, ∂
2Mˆh/∂I∂pr,2 > 0, and dRˆ2/dI < 0
hold.
On the other hand, if R
′′
1 > 0,
δC
′′
f,2Rˆ
′2
1
Λ
·
(
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
∂pˆr,2
∂R1
− ∂Mˆh/∂I · ∂pˆr,2/∂R1
∂pˆr,2/∂I
)
may be greater than one. Thus, the supply-shifting effect may dominate the direct price
effect.
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Appendix B: The supply-shifting Effect in the Case of
Joint Exploration
In the case of joint exploration, (24) can be rewritten as:
−∂Mˆh/∂I · ∂pˆr,2/∂R1
∂pˆr,2/∂I
=
C
′′
f,2
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
∂Mˆh
∂I
−(1− θ)∂Mˆh
∂I
+ C
′′
f,2
∂Rˆ2
∂pr,2
∂Mˆh
∂I
− (pˆr,2 − C ′f,2) ∂
2Mˆh
∂I∂pr,2
. (26)
It is likely that the denominator of (26) becomes smaller as θ increases, which implies
that the supply-shifting effect is likely to become greater as θ increases.
26
References
[1] Agee, Mark D. (2000). Monopoly, potential competition and private stock information
in exhaustible resource markets, Natural Resource Modeling 13(4), 419-433.
[2] Chou, Stephen Jui-Hsien, and Ngo Van Long (2009). Optimal tariffs on exhaustible
resources in the presence of cartel behavior, Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting &
Economics 16, 239-254.
[3] Consodine, Timothy J. (2006). Is the strategic petroleum reserve our ace in the hole?,
Energy Journal 27(3), 91-112.
[4] Demirer, Riza, and Ali M. Kutan (2010). The behavior of crude oil spot and futures
prices aroung OPEC and SPR announcements: and event study perspective, Energy
Economics 32(6), 1467-1476.
[5] Ejarque, Joa˜o Miguel (2011). Evaluating the economic cost of natural gas strategic
storage restrictions, Energy Economics 33 (1), 44-55.
[6] Gilbert, Richard J. and Steven M. Goldman (1978). Potential competition and the
monopoly price of an exhaustible resource, Journal of Economic Theory 17, 319-331.
[7] Groot, Fons, Cees Withagen, and Aart de Zeeuw (2003). Strong time-consistency in
the cartel-versus-fringe model, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 28, 287-306.
[8] Hillman, Arye L., and Ngo Van Long (1983). Pricing and depletion of an exhaustible
resource when there is anticipation of trade disruption, Quarterly Journal of Economics
98(2), 215-233.
[9] Karp, L. and D. Newbery (1991). Optimal tariffs on exhaustible resources, Journal of
International Economics 30, 285-299.
[10] Karp, L., and D. Newbery (1992). Dynamically consistent oil import tariffs. Canadian
Journal of Economics 25, 1-21.
[11] Mason, Charles F. (2011). On stockpiling natural resources, Resource and Energy
Economics 33 (2), 398-409.
[12] Polasky, Stephen (1996). Exploration and extraction in a duopoly-exhaustible re-
source market, Canadian Journal of Economics 29(2), 473-492.
27
[13] Ro¨theli, Tobias F. (1995). Expectations about change in market structure and natural
resource extraction, Journal of Economics 62(2), 201-214.
[14] Sadorsky, Perry A. (1992). Industry size and ‘destructive competition’ in Cournot
oligopoly models of exhaustible resource exploration and extraction, Resources and
Energy 14, 249-257.
[15] Salant, Stephen W. (1976). Exhaustible resources and industrial structure: a Nash-
Cournot approach to the world oil market, Journal of Political Economy 84(5), 1079-
1094.
[16] Teisberg, Thomas J. (1981). A dynamic programming model of the U.S. strategic
petroleum reserve, Bell Journal of Economics 12(2), 526-546.
[17] Ulph, A. M., and G. M. Folie (1980). Exhaustible resources and cartels: an intertem-
poral Nash-Cournot model, Canadian Journal of Economics 13(4), 645-658.
[18] Wei, Yi-Ming, Gang Yu, Ying Fan, and Lan-Cui Liu (2008). Empirical analysis of
optimal strategic petroleum reserve in China, Energy Economics 30, 290-302.
[19] Yucel, Mine K. (1994). Reducing U.S. vulnerability to oil supply shocks, Southern
Economic Journal, 61(2), 302-310.
28
29 
 
 
Firm f 
・・・・・・ → Mines
Resource-exporting Country (f)
World integrated market of final good X
A resource-
importing 
Country (h)
Firm h
= a final good 
producer
?
Other resource-
importing 
Countries
Other final goods 
producers
 
 
                  Figure 1. The structure of the model. 
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                    Figure 2. The structure of the game. 
 
  
1st period 
2nd period
The home government subsidizes the investment in exploration of mines 
by Firm h. (Exogenous) 
→ Firm h determines the investment amount. (Exogenous)
Firm f chooses the resource price in the first period. 
                       ↓ 
Final goods producers choose their own outputs (and the amounts of 
resource inputs) 
Firm f chooses the resource price in the first period. 
                       ↓ 
Firm h chooses the extraction amount. 
                       ↓ 
Final goods producers choose their own outputs (and the amounts of 
resource inputs) 
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          Fig.3. The shift of the supply curve by Firm h when 0ˆ 2,  rh pIM  
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          Fig.4. The shift of the supply curve by Firm h when 0ˆ 2,  rh pIM  
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